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RATIONAL HEGELIANISM

THE SCIENCE OF NOOLOGY

Christopher Richard Wade Dettling (2018)

In the first decades of the 21st century a new science is born: Noology. The brave new science of Noology comprises two fields, the theoretical and practical: (1) Mind Control and (2) the Thought Police. Noology is not the primitive “psychological warfare” of the 20th century, but a universal science which involves every dimension of Global life. Noology is not Cyber warfare, because within both the theoretical and practical fields, the distinction between domestic and foreign does not apply. Psychology and cybernetics are not entirely divorced from theoretical and practical Noology, but are rather subordinate fields that sometimes, in some areas, fall within the purview of its scope. Unlike psychology and cybernetics proper, Noology is the highest political and economic form of the computer sciences. The aim of Noology is therefore the defense, protection and preservation of the Noosphere, which is the political and economic realm of digital and electronic knowledge, both public and private: Noology is therefore the guardian of computational and technological power.

In the fields of theoretical and practical Noetics, the pejorative connotation of “mind control” and “thought police” popularized in the 20th century does not apply to the meaning of Noology: As censorship, the meanings of “mind control” and “thought police” are associated with anti–democratic and totalitarian regimes in the literature of political science. This is not the case in the New Science of Noetics. The political meaning of censorship since the French Revolution¹ is here contrasted with its economic significance, stricto sensu; the economic production and consumption of goods also involves censorship in the forms of supply and demand, as utility, value and worth; censorship as a form of “propaganda” under capitalism is an arm of advertising and marketing. Censorship in the political economy of the Industrial Revolution is not the same as its counterpart in the tradition of the French Revolution: British monarchism is not commensurate with European royalism, feudalism and aristocracy, either before or after the revolutions in Europe. In the New Science of Noetics, “bad” censorship is therefore contrasted with “good” censorship, — as truth is distinguished from error, as science is contrasted with ideology. This contrast, however, is effectuated within the realm of 20th century etymology, because of the world historical significance of totalitarianism in the modern European political and economic vocabulary of the past hundred years. In the mindset of that historical period, the lexicographical combination of the meanings of “good” and “bad” censorship in the field of political economy is not permissible because impractical and self–contradictory: The combination is politically and economically inexpedient. In the New Science of Noetics, the political and economic significance of “mind control” and “thought police” is not therefore effectuated in terms of the 20th century meanings of censorship.

The world historical origins of the the New Science of Noetics are evidenced in the first decade of the 21st century, from out of the collapse of the Cold War, especially in Europe, — in the digital revolution of supercomputers and Global telecommunications networks. As we shall discover, an essential group of extremely important ideas which underpin the digital revolution are predicated upon the theoretical and practical notion of Noology, as the circular and coaxial series of accumulation, production, dissemination, consumption, re–accumulation and reproduction of “information” in a seamless and ever–increasing web of Noematic complexifications, under the general albeit politically and economically vague conception of “datum.” This “predication” is effectuated in terms of the Noetic “logic” of computational and technological power.

In the Noetic world of today, the modern European distinctions are obliterated between science, philosophy and history as well as religion, literature and art. European modernity after the French Revolution² upholds “science” against pseudo–science or ideology in the name of Kant: Even when “scientists” distinguish themselves from ideologues, when they press–gang Locke, Leibniz, Hume and others into their cause (as well as Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley and Hegel or some other combination of rationalism versus empiricism), they always make use of their Kantian inspired categories. Modern Europeans reconcile or oppose Kant and Hegel in the name of science, inspired by their Kantian categories of the Transzendentalphilosophie: Modern science in their eyes is named as phenomenalism, realism, naturalism, empiricism, epistemology and so forth, but always in stark contrast to Western philosophy as Platonism in the Kantian sense of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Science in the 20th century connotation inherited from Kant and the French Revolution is even divided into the “hard” and “soft” sciences: Physics, biology and chemistry, for instance, are mildly opposed to economics, political science and sociology, — in the name of phenomenalism, realism, naturalism, empiricism, epistemology and so forth, in stark contrast to ideology as Platonism in the Kantian sense of the Critique of Pure Reason. Philosophy is likewise divided from sophistry, as scientific philosophy and the philosophy of science, in the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of economics, the philosophy of law (non–metaphysical jurisprudence) and so on, — in the name of phenomenalism, realism, naturalism, empiricism, epistemology and so forth, in stark contradistinction to metaphysics and ontology as Platonism in the Kantian sense of the Critique of Pure Reason. Science and scientific theory are practical, according to modern Europeans: The influential modern European distinctions between theory and practice are always cast within the Kantian inspired categorial structure of Transzendentalphilosophie. Even mathematics and logic (deductive and inductive) are rendered “scientific,” as so–called mathematical logic (probability and statistical inference), whether as logicism, formalism, intuitionism and so on, and opposed to the “outdated and pseudo–scientific” pure mathematics and logic of Western metaphysics as Platonic idealism in the Kantian sense of the Critique of Pure Reason. Modern European “scientists” (intelligentsia) are therefore blind to the conception of the New Science of Noetics, because trapped within the mental confines of their Transzendental prison inherited from Kant and the French Revolution, in the struggle between monarchism and republicanism, — as totalitarianism versus democracy, or some such version thereof.

The same remarks also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the “computer sciences”: Computer “scientists” are also blind to the conception of the New Science of Noetics, because trapped within the mental confines of their Transzendental prison inherited from Kant and the French Revolution, in the struggle between monarchism and republicanism, — as totalitarianism versus democracy. (The charge of Transzendentalismus is equally applicable to the modern European categories of military science, especially in the first half of the 20th century.) The Kantian blindness of modern European unreason affects computer scientists’ conceptualization of an essential group of extremely important conceptions which underpin the digital revolution, and which are predicated upon the theoretical and practical notion of Noology, as the seamless and ever–increasing coaxial web of Noematic complexifications, under the general albeit politically and economically vague conception of “datum.”

In other words, European modernity is blind to the rational (pure) Hegelian conception of the Weltgeist as the Anglo–Saxon World Mind, the mind of the world, which greatly advanced Western thought along the road of Noologism, especially in the 20th century. Globalism is Eurocentricism in the mindset of European modernity, otherwise world civilization is imperialism and totalitarianism: The World Mind (Weltgeist) of rational Hegelianism is thereby opposed to the Kantio–Hegelian Zeitgeist of 20th century Transzendentalphilosophie, — unless rejected outright by Kantians and Kantian anti–Hegelians.³ European “multipolarity” is Eurocentrisme because its polarity is the Transzendental prison of Kant and the French Revolution, in the 20th century polarization between Americanism and anti–Americanism, — as American totalitarianism versus European democracy: The unipolarity of modern European political and economic irrationalism is the multipolarity of Eurocentrisme in the world of today.⁴

The outdated and surpassed mentality of European modernity, especially in the realm of politics and economics, wherever found in the 21st century world, whether as Kantianism, Kantian anti–Hegelianism or Kantio–Hegelianism, is an intellectual disease:

“We use the term cyberphilosophy broadly to designate the intersection of philosophy and computing. We include not just contemporary interaction of philosophy and computing on the internet but any interaction between the two disciplines however and whenever it occurs … Our overall thesis in The Digital Phoenix was that computing provides philosophy with new and fertile subject matter, models, and methods … New philosophical subject matter that results from computing includes the fundamental notions of computing itself.”⁵

We include not just contemporary interaction of philosophy and computing on the internet but any interaction between the two disciplines however and whenever it occurs … Computing provides philosophy with new and fertile subject matter, models, and methods: No doubt these “cyberphilosophers” name as philosophy even the most satanic justifications for the barbaric use of computational devices against human beings,⁶ since they draw no rational distinction between philosophy and sophistry whatsoever, which negates their “cybertheory” of science versus ideology. Indeed, their language is the verbiage of Chomsky, Rorty and the New York intellectuals, cloaked in the terminology of their “computer science.” Undoubtedly these cybersophists will place Kant on the side of philosophy, and they will attack as ideology the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegelian philosophical science of absolute idealism. Since these cybersophists draw no rational distinction between philosophy and sophistry, their perspectives upon “computational science” are defective, meaning that their views of computing are Kantian delusions. The cybersophists will teach that what they name as “computational power” shall be deployed in the realm of politics and economics, — to uphold modern European unreason. In other words, they seek to uphold the backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts of their masters, the inferior ruling classes, — in the name of their sophistical version of “computational power.” It goes without saying that what these cybersophists name as political economy in the digital age is not Americanism, but modern European unipolarity in the world of today, as the multipolarity of Eurocentric Eurocracy and the Dieselgate aristocracy. The “computing” of cybersophistry is not the computational power of American Idealism, and is therefore politically and economically destructive of the rational planetization of world civilization unchained by the digital revolution.

“All ‘animals,’ Kant suggests, are destined to fulfill their natural purposes, and in the case of human beings this means the development of scientific and ethical rationality. The idea of human progress toward world government and perpetual peace that Rousseau ridiculed is presented here as empowered by the ‘unsociable sociability’ of humans. Though written in an admittedly somewhat speculative vein, Kant’s essay nevertheless expresses the modern outlook of many who suppose its truth even when they are silent about it. For Kant’s portrayal of rational progress seems to justify the Enlightenment doctrines about our elevation above and over against nature. At the same time, it points forward to the less qualified historical claims of Hegel, Comte, and Marx.”⁷

Kantianism expresses the modern outlook of many who suppose its truth even when they are silent about it, at the same time, it points forward to the less qualified historical claims of Hegel?⁸ Which Hegel is this, the pure Hegel of the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegelian philosophical science of absolute idealism, otherwise the impure Hegel of the pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism of modern European political and economic irrationalism, especially in the 20th century? Since these “cyberphilosophers” and “technologists” draw no exact historiographical and world historical distinction between philosophy and sophistry, it follows that their perspective of science versus ideology is defective, since what they name as the “rational progress” of scientific cognition or reason, whether as psychology or otherwise, is mired in subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism, — in the tradition of modern European unreason: The same rational Hegelian refutation applies to their Kantian, Kantian anti–Hegelian and Kantio–Hegelian “doctrines” of technological political economy and technocracy, following in the world historical footsteps of the 20th century American Idealist rejections of Leninism, Stalinism, Hitlerism and Maoism.

The rational conception of the digital revolution is incomplete without exact historiography and world history, as the world historical result of the great American Idealists of the White House, Washington and Wall Street: The Noetic scientivity of the Noosphere, as the new science of computational power, is itself inscribed within the American digital revolution.

In the fields of theoretical and practical Noetics, the pejorative connotation of “mind control” and “thought police” does not therefore apply to the 21st century meaning of Noology: As censorship, the meanings of “mind control” and “thought police” are associated more with the connotation of self–education and re–education, in the rational Hegelian sense of self–determination as causa sui, as the Noetic self–consciousness of the World Mind. Self–determination is therefore an extremely important conception, in the Noetic sense, which underpins the digital revolution, and which is predicated upon the theoretical and practical notion of Noology, as the Noetic conception of self–conscious datum, in the seamless and ever–increasing coaxial web of Noematic complexifications of the World Mind.

The World Mind of pure Hegelianism is the Noosphere: “Mind is only what it does, and its act is to make itself the object of its own consciousness. In history its act is to gain consciousness of itself as mind, to apprehend itself in its interpretation of itself to itself. This apprehension is its being and its principle, and the completion of apprehension at one stage is at the same time the rejection of that stage and its transition to a higher. To use abstract phraseology, the mind apprehending this apprehension anew, or in other words returning to itself again out of its rejection of this lower stage of apprehension, is the mind of the higher stage than that on which it stood in its earlier apprehension.”⁹

The Noosphere is therefore the World Mind of genuine Hegelianism as the history of the world: “Since mind is implicitly and actually reason, and reason is explicit to itself in mind as knowledge, world history is the necessary development, out of the concept of mind’s freedom alone, of the moments of reason and so of the self–consciousness and freedom of mind. This development is the interpretation and actualization of the universal mind.”¹⁰

The history of the world is the self–consciousness freedom of mind, the interpretation and actualization of the World Mind, as reason explicit to itself in mind as knowledge. Noology is therefore reason explicit to itself in mind as knowledge, the interpretation and actualization of the World Mind, as the history of the world, the highest political and economic form of the computer sciences, — not as “artificial intelligence,” but as the Noetic scientivity of the Noosphere.

The New Science of Noology, the Noetic scientivity of the Noosphere as the Weltgeist of rational Hegelianism, is the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine (pure) Hegelian philosophical science of absolute idealism in the American world of today. Computer science, as comprehended by the avatars of European modernity, is a delusion in the 21st century: The outdated modern European distinctions between science and ideology are surpassed and overcome in the American political and economic rationality of Globalism. They are overcome, the modern European Kantian, Kantian anti–Hegelian and Kantio–Hegelian divisions between science, philosophy and history as well as religion, literature and art: The World Mind of today, apprehends modernity anew, in other words, returns to itself again out of its rejection of the modern phase of apprehension, the rejection and return constitute the mentality of Globalism as world civilization, the highest stage of universal freedom as American Liberty, — higher than the modern, mediaeval, ancient and archaic mentalities. We name the theoretical and practical upholding and uplifting of the mentality of Globalism, established in the Global divisions of American political and economic rationality, as the New Science of Noology, the guardian of American computational and technological superpower.

The 20th century Kantian, Kantian anti–Hegelian and Kantio–Hegelian versions of Noology¹¹ and the Noosphere¹² are overcome and surpassed in the supremacy of rational Hegelianism: The 21st century revolutionary Global power of the Noosphere is the Noological political economy of Noetic scientivity as the developmental unification of the coaxial integration of the American world.¹³

1. See: “The statesmen of the French Revolution roused their fellow countrymen to the most astounding military efforts by announcing that France would compel all other nations to be free in the same sense as herself. Under Napoléon I, and more obscurely under his nephew, Napoléon III, France aspired to impose her suzerainty by force of arms upon the whole of Western Europe.”

Frank Morgan and Henry William Carless Davis, French Policy Since 1871, London, Oxford University Press, 1914, 4.

See also: “The history of France between the fall of Robespierre and the rise of Napoléon is full of instruction for those who believe in representative democracy as a universal panacea for the political distempers of mankind.”

Walter Alison Phillips, “Preface,” After Robespierre: The Thermidorian Reaction, Albert Mathiez; Cathrine Alison Phillips, translator, New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1965, v–vii; vii. [1931]

See also: “There is no mystery about the origins of Bonapartism. It is the child of Napoléon Bonaparte and the French Revolution … the strong executive founded upon the plebiscite which was to be the pillar of Bonapartism; and [Napoléon] had come to the conclusion that legislative assemblies should be merely supervisory, that they should have no power to change the constitution or to interfere with the executive … This is not the place for a detailed examination of the principles of Napoléonic law. It is well, however, to notice that the civil code alone was drawn up during the Consulate, that it is nearer both in time and spirit to the revolutionary law than are the codes which were compiled in a more perfunctory manner under the darker shadows of imperial despotism … in the codes, in the common system of administration, the foundations of a modern Italy were laid. And here the memory of Napoléon was not easily forgotten … The French nation, being consulted for the third time, for the third time by an overwhelming majority ratified its belief in Bonapartism … The guiding principle of Bonapartism was autocracy founded on popular consent.”

Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher, Bonapartism: Six Lectures Delivered in the University of London, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1908, 7–22–39–55–87–120.

See also: “Until very recently it would have been a somewhat sensational thing for one to say of the French that they were a reasonable people, with a settled government and a history worthy of emulation. There is a widespread impression that the French are a distinctly inferior race. The nation is said to be in decline. The people are said to be effeminate, trivial, excitable, unreasoning, irreligious, immoral when not unmoral, with an impure literature and art, an unstable and tottering government and a diminishing birth–rate. These charges are confirmed by many observers … Nations, like individuals, have reputations, and they are for the most part in the keeping of their enemies or rivals … A glance at the product of the French Parliament since 1879 shows that France today, as well as England, is a land where ‘freedom slowly broadens down,’ if not from precedent to precedent, at least from statute to statute. To be sure freedom is a larger thing than acts of legislatures, but it is also larger than decisions of judges. Reforms of abuses which the state can prevent constitute merely those definite stages in the advance of freedom which the historian can register as indices of the nation’s purpose. Yet here the work of the Parliament of the Third Republic will bear comparison with that complex and often hidden line of progress to be traced in England through law courts, local government and Parliament.”

James Thomson Shotwell, “The Political Capacity of the French,” Political Science Quarterly, 24(1 March 1909): 115–126; 115–120. [Italics added]

See finally: “[The Russian] Revolution is the greatest service which they [Russian revolutionaries] have yet made to the cause for which the Allied peoples have been fighting since August 1914 … this war is at bottom a struggle for popular Government as well as for liberty.”

David Lloyd George in Robert Kinloch Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra, New York, Atheneum, 1967, 459.

Remark: Modern historiasters, whose flabby minds are deeply infatuated with the outdated Napoléonic and French Revolutionary conception of right, which they advance with the inert ideas of Kantio–Hegelianism (in order to protect the backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts of their political and economic masters by persuading the electorate that autocracy founded on popular consent is American Liberty), ignore and neglect the fact that the first half of 19th century world history signalizes the beginning of the great clash between the old and new worlds, which culminates in the American Civil War and the birth of universal political and economic freedom: This phase of American history exemplifies the rise of the United States as a continental power. The great historical clash between the United States of America and the British Empire after the Civil War brings Canada into the world. In this great financial, commercial and industrial struggle for world power, in order to hold together their empire, British statesmen are forced to make political and economic concessions, to blunt the attraction of Americanism in Canada, in the name of constitutional monarchism, i.e., as liberalism: The “reform” the British monarchists espouse is not the cause of American Liberty, but modern European raison d’état, namely Bonapartism, or autocracy founded upon popular consent. Thus the British Lords and their great empire are consumed in the historical flames of 1914, in the European conflagration that they themselves prepared, in their profoundly anti–American world policy. Once the rats are in the pantry, they spoil the cheese.

As the British Imperialists sink into oblivion, the political and economic barriers with which they contained modern European raison d’état in the New World are slowly released, and the plague of unreason is thus unchained upon the British Dominions of Canada.

2. See: “The publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason marks one of the two key events after which we may take nineteenth–century philosophy to begin. The other event is the French Revolution, of which many people saw Kant’s philosophy, with its emphasis on autonomy, as the theoretical correlate. “Nineteenth–century” philosophy … thus actually begins in the later 1780s and the 1790s, in response to Kant’s Critical philosophy and the French Revolution.”

Alison Stone, editor, “Introduction: Philosophy in the Nineteenth–Century,” The Edinburgh Critical History of Nineteenth–Century Philosophy, Howard Caygill & David Webb, general editors, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2011, 1–12; 1.

See also: “The awakening of the new age, namely, the “kingdom of the realized spirit” (royaume de l’esprit réalisé), is the age of the Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant and the French Revolution. A free will, albeit formal, whose content is created as it touches the real, is the Kantian principle: This principle of the Critical Philosophy, without doubt, is the very basis of the French Revolution (c’est là le principe kantien et c’est, non moins, le principe de la Révolution française). The Kantian principle brings practical results to the French Revolution. Kantian reason legislates for the collective will as well as for the individual will … The French Revolution made the bold attempt to begin with individual wills, with the atoms of will: The revolutionary philosophy of Kant attacks the collective will of the Ancien Régime for its abusive privileges.”

Charles Philippe Théodore Andler (1866–1933), “Préface: Hegel,” Le pangermanisme philosophique, 1800 à 1914: Textes traduits de l’Allemand par M. Aboucaya [Claude Aboucaya?], G. Bianquis [Geneviève Bianquis, 1886–1972], M. Bloch [Gustave Bloch, 1848–1923], L. Brevet, J. Dessert, M. Dresch [Joseph Dresch, 1871–1958], A. Fabri, A. Giacomelli, B. Lehoc, G. Lenoir, L. Marchand [Louis Marchand, 1875–1948], R. Serreau [René Serreau], A. Thomas [Albert Thomas, 1878–1932], J. Wehrlin, Paris, Louis Conard, Librairie–Éditeur, 1917, xxix–xlv; xliii: “L’ère nouvelle qui s’annonce, c’est–à–dire le ‘royaume de l’esprit réalisé,’ est celle, non seulement de Kant, mais de la Révolution française. Un vouloir libre, tout formel, dont le contenu se crée à mesure qu’il touche au réel, c’est là le principe kantien et c’est, non moins, le principe de la Révolution française. Ce principe donne des résultats pratiques dans la Révolution d’abord. La raison kantienne légifère pour le vouloir collectif comme pour le vouloir individuel … La Révolution fit cette tentative audacieuse de commencer par les vouloirs individuels, par les atomes du vouloir. C’est le vouloir collectif, l’Ancien Régime, que la philosophie révolutionnaire incrimine pour ses privilèges abusifs.”

See finally: “The standpoint of Kantian philosophy is a high one … the march of God in the world, that is what the state is.”

Eduard Gans, “Additions to The Philosophy of Right,” Great Books of the Western World: Hegel, vol. 46, G.W.F. Hegel; Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica, 1960, Addition 1–Addition 194, 115–150; Addition 86 = §135/129–Addition 152 = §258/141. [Lasson, 2nd edition, 1921]

Eduard Gans, “Zusätze aus Hegels Vorlesungen, zusammengestellt,” Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit den von Eduard Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, neu herausgeben, von Georg Lasson, Herausgegeber, [=Hegels sämtliche Werke, Band VI], Leipzig, Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1911, Zusätze 1–Zusätze 194, 281–371; Zusätze 86 = §135, 318–Zusätze 152 = §258, 349: “Den Standpunkt der Kantischen Philosophie hervorhoben … Es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt, daß der Staat ist.”

3. See: “After Hegel’s death, his former students came together with the rather noble thought of assembling various transcripts of the lecture series he gave and to which they had access, hoping to bring to the light of a general public the ‘system’ that [they] were convinced was completed for years and presented orally in the lecture hall. However, the methodologies through which they assembled these transcripts into standalone monographs, with the aid of Hegel’s own manuscripts for his lectures, is [are] dubious at best. They paid little to no attention to changes between different lecture courses, combining them as they saw fit to guarantee the logical progression of the dialectical movement as they interpreted it. But without the original source material, it was impossible to test the suspicion that they may have falsified Hegel’s own views. Indeed, it was all we had to go on to have any understanding of his views. Now, however, many manuscripts and transcripts — even ones not available to his students — have been found. When one compares these manuscripts and transcripts with the lectures published by his students, the differences between them are in no case simply philological niceties … this information may drastically challenge our historical picture of Hegel.”

Sean J. McGrath & Joseph Carew, editors, “Introduction: What Remains of German Idealism?” Rethinking German Idealism, Joseph Carew, Wes Furlotte, Jean–Christophe Goddard, Adrian Johnston, Cem Kömürcü, Sean J. McGrath, Constantin Rauer, Alexander Schnell, F. Scott Scribner, Devin Zane Shaw, Konrad Utz & Jason M. Wirth, contributors, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 1–19; 4. [Italics added]

See also: “Hegel’s own course notes and those of his students should be used with caution to clarify and illustrate the meaning of the texts he published during his lifetime … In general, the student notes written during or after Hegel’s classes should be used with caution … What has been said about the student notes must also be applied to the so–called Zusatze (additions), added by ‘the friends’ to the third edition of the Encyclopedia (1830) and the book on Rechtsphilosophie … Some commentators, however, seem to prefer the Zusatze over Hegel’s own writings; additions are sometimes even quoted as the only textual evidence for the interpretation of highly controversial issues. For scholarly use, however, we should use them only as applications, confirmations, or concretizations of Hegel’s theory. Only in cases where authentic texts are unavailable may they be accepted as indications of Hegel’s answers to questions that are not treated in his handwritten or published work. If they contradict the explicit theory of the authorized texts, we can presume that the student is wrong, unless we can show that it is plausible that they express a change in the evolution of Hegel’s thought … According to Leopold von Henning’s preface (pp. vi–vii) in his edition (1839) of the Encyclopädie of 1830, the editors of the Encyclopedia sometimes changed or completed the sentences in which the students had rendered Hegel’s classes.”

Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, Dordrecht, Springer Science+Business Media, B.V., 2001, xvi–27–28–29–29.

See also: “The transcripts known today for all the Berlin lecture series are consistently, even surprisingly, reliable testimonies … It may indeed be disconcerting that only today do we doubt — and not everyone does — that Hegel’s lectures … are actually reproduced authentically in the published [Berlin] edition … that did not become full–blown for more than a hundred and fifty years. We can hardly examine here all the reasons for this circumstance.”
Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, “Introduction: The Shape and Influence of Hegel’s Aesthetics,” Lectures on the Philosophy of Art: The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures, Robert F. Brown, editor and translator, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, 7–176; 32–36–36–36.

See finally: “[The] more sympathetic tradition in Hegel scholarship has reasserted itself decisively since the middle of this century, to such an extent that there is now a virtual consensus among knowledgeable scholars that the earlier images of Hegel, as philosopher of the reactionary Prussian restoration and forerunner of modern totalitarianism, are simply wrong, whether they are viewed as accounts of Hegel’s attitude toward Prussian politics or as broader philosophical interpretations of his theory of the state.”

Allen William Wood, editor, “Editor’s Introduction,” Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel; Hugh Barr Nisbet, translator, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, vii–xxxii; ix. [1991]

4. “We used to call Hitler wicked for killing off the Jews, but Kennedy and Macmillan are much more wicked than Hitler. The idea of weapons of mass–extermination is utterly horrible and is something which no one with one spark of humanity can tolerate. I will not pretend to obey a Government which is organizing mass massacres of mankind. I will do everything I can to oppose the Government in any way which I think can be fruitful and I exhort you to do the same. We cannot obey these murderers. They are wicked. They are abominable. They are the wickedest people who ever lived in the history of man and it is our duty to do what we can against them.”

Bertrand Arthur William Russell (April 1961) in Harvey Arthur DeWeerd, Lord Russell’s War Crimes Tribunal, Santa Monica, California, The RAND Corporation, 1967, 3.

See also: “The tribunal held its preliminary meeting in London on November 16, 1966 … The make–up of the tribunal seemed to be as follows: Lord Russell, honorary president; Jean–Paul Sartre, executive president; Vladimir Dedijer, the Jugoslav historian, chairman … Other members included: Gunther Anders, German author; Wolfgang Abendorth of Marburg University; Mehmet Ali Aybar, president of the far–left Turkish Worker’s Party; Mahmud Ali Kasuri, general secretary of the West Pakistan Awami Party; Lelio Basso, an Italian socialist parliamentarian; Lawrence Daly of the Scottish National Union of Mineworkers; Simone de Beauvoir, the French writer; Lazaro Cardenas, former President of Mexico; Dave Dellinger, an American pacifist and editor of Liberation; Isaac Deutscher, a polish–born biographer of Trotsky; Stokely Carmichael, the champion of Black Power; Amado Hernandez, poet laureate of the Philippines; Kinju Morikawa of the Civil Liberties Association of Japan; Shoichi Sakata, Nobel Prize winner; and Laurent Schwartz, French mathematician.”

Harvey Arthur DeWeerd, Lord Russell’s War Crimes Tribunal, Santa Monica, California, The RAND Corporation, 1967, 11.

See also: “Hegel was the culmination of the movement in German philosophy that started from Kant; although he [Hegel] often criticized Kant, his system could never have arisen if Kant’s had not existed … The identification of the real and the rational leads unavoidably to some of the complacency inseparable from the belief that ‘whatever is, is right’… All these quotations are from the introduction to The Philosophy of History … [Hegel’s] is a very superfine brand of freedom. It does not mean that you will be able to keep out of a concentration camp. It does not imply democracy, or a free press, or any of the usual Liberal watchwords, which Hegel rejects with contempt … I doubt whether, in Hegel’s opinion, a man could be a ‘hero’ without being a military conqueror. Hegel’s emphasis on nations, together with his peculiar conception of ‘freedom,’ explains his glorification of the State — a very important aspect of his political philosophy, to which we must now turn our attention. His philosophy of the State is developed both in his Philosophy of History and in his Philosophy of Law … Hegel’s doctrine of the State — [is] a doctrine which, if accepted, justifies every internal tyranny and every external aggression that can possibly be imagined. The strength of his bias appears in the fact that his theory is largely inconsistent with his own metaphysic, and that the inconsistencies are all such as tend to the justification of cruelty and international brigandage. A man may be pardoned if logic compels him regretfully to reach conclusions which he deplores, but not for departing from logic in order to be free to advocate crimes … Hegel thought that, if enough was known about a thing to distinguish it from all other things, then all its properties could be inferred by logic. This was a mistake, and from this mistake arose the whole imposing edifice of his system.”
Bertrand Arthur William Russell, History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1947, 757–758–763–764–766–768–772.

See also: “No logical absurdity results from the hypothesis that the world consists of myself and my thoughts and feelings and sensations, and that everything else is mere fancy … Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true.”

Bertrand Arthur William Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, London, Williams & Norgate, 1912, 34–249.

See finally: “[Hegel] was great, on the one hand by his metaphysical results, on the other by his logical method; on the one hand as the crown of dogmatic philosophy, on the other as the founder of the dialectic, with its then revolutionary doctrine of historical development. Both these aspects of Hegel’s work revolutionized thought … the practical tendency of his metaphysics was, and is, to glorify existing institutions, to see in Church and State the objective embodiment of the Absolute Idea, his dialectic method tended to exhibit no proposition as unqualified truth, no state of things as final perfection … The validity of this view we need not here examine; it is sufficient to point out that Hegel, in his ‘Philosophy of History,’ endeavored to exhibit the actual course of the world as following the same necessary chain of development which, as it exists in thought, forms the subject of his logic … the development of the world therefore proceeds by action and reaction, or, in technical language, by thesis and antithesis, and these become reconciled in a higher unity, the synthesis of both … we might live to see another French Revolution, perhaps even more glorious than the first, leaving Social Democracy to try one of the greatest and most crucial experiments in political history.”

Bertrand Arthur William Russell, German Social Democracy: Six Lectures, With an Appendix on Social Democracy and the Woman Question in Germany by Alys Russell, London and New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1896, 2–163.

5. Terrell Ward Bynum & James H. Moor, editors and contributors, “Introduction to Cyberphilosophy,” Cyberphilosophy: The Intersection of Computing and Philosophy, Collin Allen, John A. Barker, Anthony F. Beavers, Terrell Ward Bynum, Marvin Croy, Randall R. Dipert, Charles Ess, Luciano Floridi, Patrick Grim, Gene Korienek, Gert–Jan Lokhorst, Pete Mandik, Walter Maner, James H. Moor Uri Nodelman, Richard Scheines, Susan Stuart, John P. Sullins, William Uzgalis, Jeroen Van Den Hoven, John Weckert & Edward N. Zalta, contributors & Armen T. Marsoobian & Brian J. Huschle, series editors, Oxford, Oxfordshire, Basil Henry Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002, 1–7; 1–2–2.

See: “[1] We use the term cyberphilosophy broadly to designate the intersection of philosophy and computing. We include not just contemporary interaction of philosophy and computing on the internet but any interaction between the two disciplines however and whenever it occurs. It way come as a surprise to some that philosophers have been interested in computing for centuries … both Blaise Pascal and Gottfried Leibniz were mathematically inclined philosophers who built early calculating devices … Cyberphilosophy came into its own during the twentieth century as a result of the formulation of the theory of computing by Alan Turing, and others, by analysis of social and ethical implications of computing by Norbert Weiner, and by the development of increasingly sophisticated computers, software, and networks. The possibility of creating intelligent machines, or at least machines that could perform tasks that normally required human intelligence, became a reality that fueled the philosophical debate whether minds should be properly understood as computational devices. The deployment of computing technology in the twentieth century raised conceptual and ethical questions about privacy, property, and power … [2] Our overall thesis in The Digital Phoenix was that computing provides philosophy with new and fertile subject matter, models, and methods … New philosophical subject matter that results from computing includes the fundamental notions of computing itself. What is a computation? What is an algorithm? A program? What is information? Is hypercomputation beyond the classical limits of Turing machines possible? Some new subject matter is generated by subfields of computing, such as artificial intelligence, robotics, and artificial life. Is artificial intelligence possible, and by what criteria? What is the relationship between having intelligence and having a body? Can virtual creatures possess understanding? Can computerized creatures that reproduce, evolve, and move about their environment consuming resources be alive? And, of course, further important subject matter concerns the impact of computing on people. What should the proper political, social, and ethical applications of computing technology be?”

Terrell Ward Bynum & James H. Moor, Ibidem, 1–1–1–2–2.

See also: Terrell Ward Bynum & James H. Moor, The Digital Phoenix: How Computers Are Changing Philosophy, Oxford, Oxfordshire, Basil Henry Blackwell, 1998.

6. See: Edwin Black, IBM and the Holocaust: The Strategic Alliance Between Nazi Germany and America’s Most Powerful Corporation, New York, Crown Books, 2001.

See also: Martin Cave, Computers and Economic Planning: The Soviet Experience, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980.

7. Val Dusek & Robert C. Scharff, editors, “Introduction: The Historical Background,” Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition: An Anthology, 2nd edition, Malden, Massachusetts, Wiley–Basil Henry Blackwell, 2014, 1–7; 6. [Italics added]

Remark: In this publication by Wiley and Blackwell, Dusek and Scharff advance no rational argument that the “historical claims” of Hegel are “less qualified” than those of Kant. Neither do these editors advance a rational argument, the conclusion of which is: “Kant’s essay nevertheless [therefore] expresses the modern outlook of many who suppose its truth.” [Italics added] This type of propaganda appears as reminiscent of the 20th century publishing interests of Victor Gollancz, Lawrence and Wishart, George Allen and Unwin and so forth, whose many publications in the field of “science” glorified as “scientific theories” the justifications of the “political and economic” doctrines of Eurocommunism in the English–speaking world during the Cold War, which are destructively opposed to 20th century Americanism: This same propaganda appears aimed at the public opinion of the Anglo–Saxon intelligentsia, especially with regards to the promotion of French, German and Russian Continental European political and economic aspirations during the Cold War. For these reasons, admittedly hypothetical, we must wonder: How much investment from the European Dieselgate aristocracy is found in publishing corporations such as Wiley and Basil Henry Blackwell?

8. See: “It is now known that unlike Kant, Hegel was despised by the Nazis.”

Yitzhak Y. Melamed & Peter Thielke, “Hegelianism,” New Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Game Theory to Lysenkoism, vol. 3, Maryanne Cline Horowitz, editor in chief, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2005, 977.

See also: Charles W. Mills, “Kant’s Untermenschen,” Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy, Andrew Valls, editor, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 2005, 169–193.

See also: Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, Dritte Auglage, Munchen, F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1916. [1905 & 1908]

See finally: Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Immanuel Kant: A Study and a Comparison with Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Bruno, Plato and Descartes, 2 vols., John Lees, translator & Algernon Bertram Freeman–Mitford (1st Baron Redesdale/Lord Redesdale, 1837–1916), introduction, London/New York/Toronto, John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1914. [1910]

Remark: The Kantian, Kantian anti–Hegelian and Kantio–Hegelian sophistical and ideological distinctions between superior and inferior ruling classes in the realm of modern European political economy, are the result of the outdated and surpassed Napoléonic and French Revolutionary category of right, which is Bonapartism, meaning that the raison d’état of European modernity is Machiavellianism: Modern European right is not Global freedom.

See: Aimé Guillon de Montléon (1758–1842), Machiavel commenté par Napoléon Bonaparte, manuscrit trouvé dans la carrosse de Bonaparte, après la bataille de Mont–Saint–Jean, le 15 février 1815, Paris, Nicolle, 1816.

See finally: “These principalities, therefore, are secure and happy. But as they are upheld by higher causes, which the human mind cannot attain to, I will abstain from speaking of them; for being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the work of a presumptuous and foolish man to discuss them … [Rulers] cannot observe all those things which are considered good in men, being often obliged, in order to maintain the state, to act against faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion … [Rulers] must have a mind disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations of fortune dictate, and, as I said before, not deviate from what is good, if possible, but be able to do evil if necessitated … It is not unknown to me how many have been and are of opinion that worldly events are so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot by their prudence change them, and that on the contrary there is no remedy whatever, and for this they may judge it to be useless to toil much about them, but let things be ruled by chance … Our freewill may not be altogether extinguished, I think it may be true that fortune is the ruler of half our actions, but that she allows the other half or a little less to be governed by us. I would compare her to an impetuous river that, when turbulent, inundates the plains, ruins trees and buildings, removes earth from this side and places it on the other; every one flies before it, and everything yields to its fury without being able to oppose it; and yet though it is of such a kind, still when it is quiet, men can make provision against it by dams and banks, so that when it rises it will either go into a canal or its rush will not be so wild and dangerous. It happens similarly with fortune, which shows her power where no measures have been taken to resist her, and turns her fury where she knows that no dams or barriers have been made to hold her … if one could change one’s nature with time and circumstances, fortune would never change … fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, if you wish to master her, to conquer her by force; and it can be seen that she lets herself be overcome by these rather than by those who proceed coldly. And therefore, like a woman, she is a friend to the young, because they are less cautious, fiercer, and master her with greater audacity … God will not do everything, in order not to deprive us of freewill.”

Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli, The Prince, Luigi Ricci, translator, Oxford, Humphrey Milford, 1921, 44–71–71–99–100–101–102–105.

9. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator, Oxford, Oxfordshire, Oxford University Press, 1952, §343, 216–217. [1821–1942]

10. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator, Oxford, Oxfordshire, Oxford University Press, 1952, §342, 216. [1821–1942]

11. See: “Plato, abandoning the world of sense because of the narrow limits it sets to the understanding, ventured upon the wings of ideas beyond it, into the void space of pure intellect … [Plato] did not reflect that he made no real progress by all his efforts; for he met with no resistance which might serve him for support, as it were, whereon to rest, and on which he might apply his powers, in order to let the intellect acquire momentum for its progress … Plato employed the expression idea in a way that plainly showed he meant by it something which is never derived from the senses, but which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding, inasmuch as in experience nothing perfectly corresponding to them could be found. Ideas are, according to him, archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible experiences … In his view, they flow from the highest reason, by which they have been imparted to human reason, which, however, exists no longer in its original state, but is obliged with great labour to recall by reminiscence — which is called philosophy — the old but now sadly obscured ideas. I will not here enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher attached to this expression … I cannot follow him [Plato] in this, and as little can I follow him in his mystical deduction of these ideas, or in his hypostatization of them … What I have termed an ideal was in Plato’s philosophy an idea of the divine mind — an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal existences … Aristotle may be regarded as head of the empiricists, and Plato of the noologists.”
Immanuel Kant, “The Critique of Pure Reason,” Great Books of the Western World: Kant, John Miller Dow Meiklejohn, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, Chicago, 1960, 16–16–113–113–114–173–249.

Remark: But which Platonic “ideas” are these, drawn from the Plato of Aldus Pius Manutius and Μάρκος Μουσοῦρος, Marsilius Ficinus, Henricus Stephanus and Joannes Serranus or perhaps even from Daniel Albert Wyttenbach? Kant: “I will not here enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher [Plato] attached to this expression [idea].” The Kantian distinction between noologism and empiricism in the Kantian history of philosophy is therefore unfounded, otherwise mired in modern subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism. What a pity, indeed …

See also: “[Plato] has expressed for all time the perfect exemplar of the rationalistic temper.”

Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, Plato or Protagoras? Being a Critical Examination of the Protagoras Speech in the Theaetetus with Some Remarks Upon Error, Oxford, Basil Henry Blackwell, 1908, 29.

See finally: “Has not the time come when Kant’s ‘Copernican change of standpoint’ might at last be put into practice seriously, and when Truth, instead of being offered up to idols and sacrificed to ‘ideals,’ might at length be depicted in her human beauty and simplicity?”
Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, Studies in Humanism, London, Macmillan, 1907, 178.

12. See: “In spite of certain appearances to the contrary, the ‘Weltanschauung’ I offer in no way represents a fixed and closed system. There is no question here (for such a thing would be absurd) of a deductive solution to the world, in the manner of Hegel, of a deductive framework of truth — it is simply a cluster of axial lines of progression, such as exists and gradually comes to light in every evolutionary system. There is no exhaustive presentation of the truth; there are simply lines of penetration through which we can see a still unexplored immensity of the real opening up for us.”

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955), “My Fundamental Vision,” Toward the Future, René Hague (1905–1981), translator & Norbertus Maximiliaan Wildiers (1904–1996), forward, New York, A Harvest Book/Harcourt, Incorporated, 2002, 163–208; 164. [1974]

See also: “Plato, Spinoza and Hegel were able to elaborate views which compete in amplitude with the perspectives of the Incarnation. Yet none of these metaphysical systems advanced beyond the limits of ideology.”

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, Bernard Wall, translator & Julian Huxley, introduction, New York, Harper Perennial Modern Thought, 2008, 295. [1955]

See also: “Kant’s doctrines are destructively opposed to Catholicism. His teaching has been condemned by Popes Leo XIII and Pius X. His great work, ‘The Critique of Pure Reason’ was placed on the Index, 11th June, 1827. Inconsistent with Catholic teaching are (1) Kant’s Metaphysical Agnosticism, which declares his ignorance of all things as they really are; (2) his Moral Dogmatism which declares the supremacy of will over reason, thereby making blind will without the guidance of reason the rule of action; (3) his giving to religious dogma merely a symbolic signification; (4) diametrically opposed to scholastic teaching and the common sense of mankind is Kant’s theory of knowledge which makes mind and thought the measure of reality rather than making reality the measure of mind and thought. Kant maintains that things are so because we must think them so, not that we must think them so because they are really so independently of our thinking them. The reversal of the order of thought and reality, Kant calls his ‘Copernican Revolution’ in his theory of knowledge.”

Michael Joseph Mahony, History of Modern Thought, New York, Fordham University Press, 1933, 166.

Remark: Pierre Teilhard de Chardin hides his Kantianism and thereby avoids condemnation and punishment from the Pope and Catholic Clergy in Rome, but he does not hide his anti–Hegelianism, which upon close inspection, will be revealed as a European Kantio–Hegelian species of French pseudo–Hegelianism.

See also: “[151] We must enlarge our approach to encompass the formation, taking place before our eyes and arising out of this factor of hominization, of a particular biological entity such as has never before existed on earth — the growth, outside and above the biosphere, of an added planetary layer, an envelope of thinking substance, to which, for the sake of convenience and symmetry, I have given the name of the Noosphere … [160] To an increasing extent every machine comes into being as a function of every other machine; and, again to an increasing extent, all the machines on earth, taken together, tend to form a single, vast, organized mechanism. Necessarily following the inflexive tendency of the zoological phyla, the mechanical phyla in their turn curve inward in the case of man, thus accelerating and multiplying their own growth and forming a single gigantic network girdling the earth. And the basis, the inventive core of this vast apparatus, what is it if not the thinking center of the Noosphere? … It is not merely a matter of the machine which liberates, relieving both individual and [162] collective thought of the trammels which hinder its progress, but also of the machine which creates, helping to assemble, and to concentrate in the form of an ever more deeply penetrating organism, all the reflective elements upon earth. I am thinking, of course, in the first place of the extraordinary network of radio and television communications which, perhaps anticipating the direct syntonization of brains through the mysterious power of telepathy, already link us all in a sort of “etherized” universal consciousness. But I am also thinking of the insidious growth of those astonishing electronic computers which, pulsating with signals at the rate of hundreds of thousands a second, not only relieve our brains of tedious and exhausting work but, because they enhance the essential (and too little noted) factor of “speed of thought,” are also paving the way for a revolution in the sphere of research … [162] all these material instruments, ineluctably linked in their birth and development, are finally nothing less than the manifestation of a particular kind of super–Brain, capable of attaining mastery over some supersphere in the universe and in the realm of thought.”

Pierre Teilard de Chardin, “The Formation of the Noosphere: A Plausible Biological Interpretation of Human History,” The Future of Man, Norman Denny, editor and translator, New York, Doubleday, 1964, 149–178; 151–160–161–162–162. [1947 & 1959]

See finally: Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, “A Summary of My ‘Phenomenological’ View of the World: The Starting–Point and Key of the Whole System,” Toward the Future, René Hague, translator & Norbertus Maximiliaan Wildiers, forward, New York, A Harvest Book/Harcourt, Incorporated, 2002, 212–215. [1954 & 1974]

13. See: “That I have laid out some of the philosophical reasons for this doctrine in the third edition of another writing of mine, an outline of sorts, named Americanism, is of slight importance: That the teaching therein involves the sciences of economics and politics is of some interest, however, and therefore has a bearing upon the subject at hand, namely, as the developmental unification and coaxial integration of the American world. In that work I flatter myself as the first Hegelian philosopher ever to apply the Dialectic of Hegel to the Hegelian Dialectic: ‘Modern irrationalism, in order to validate pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism, squares the Lecture Notes and the great works published by Hegel in his lifetime. Pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism thus squares both Kant and Hegel in order to prove the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of Absolute Idealism is flawed. Irrationalism thus perverts the history of philosophy and modern Europe … Pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism is therefore the political and economic mask of modern European Raison d’État. One drawback will never be remedied in Hegel philology: The Lecture Notes are not authoritative and are therefore useless in the exact determination of the ultimate worth of genuine Hegelianism … In the 20th century upwards of 500 million human beings were slaughtered in the contagion of modern political and economic satanism, more than in all the periods of history combined: Many hundreds of millions more were utterly ruined and destroyed by the most barbaric slavery ever recorded in the world. This is the ultimate verdict of exact historiography and universal history. From whence comes the disease of modern unreason?’”
Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, Stronghold of Hegel: Modern Enemies of Plato and Hegel, 1st edition, San Francisco, California, The Medium Corporation, 2016.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (1): Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft Heidelberg 1817–1818, Mit Nachträgen aus der Vorlesung 1818–1819, — Nachgeschrieben von Peter Wannenmann, Claudia Becker, Wolfgang Bonsiepen, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Kurt Rainer Meist, Friedrich Hogemann, Hans Josef Schneider, Walter Jaeschke, Christoph Jamme & Hans Christian Lucas, Herausgegeben, Mit einer Einleitung von Otto Pöggeler, Band 1, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (2): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst, Berlin 1823, — Nachgeschrieben von Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Hrsg., Band 2, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (3): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, Einleitung, Der Begriff der Religion, Walter Jaeschke, Hrsg., Band 3, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (4): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 2, Die bestimmte Religion, in zwei Bänden: Textband (a), Anhang (b), Mit einem Begriffs– Realien– und Personenverzeichnis zum Gesamtwerk, Walter Jaeschke, Hrsg., Band 4, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (5): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, Die vollendete Religion, Walter Jaeschke, Hrsg., Band 5, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1984).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (6): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 1, Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie, Orientalische Philosophie, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 6, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1994).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (7): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 2, Griechische Philosophie, I, Thales bis Kyniker, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 7, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1989).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (8): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 3, Griechische Philosophie, II, Plato bis Proklos, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 8, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (9): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 4, Philosophie des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 9, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1986).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (10): Vorlesungen über die Logik, Berlin 1831, — Nachgeschrieben von Karl Hegel, Udo Rameil, Hrsg., Herausgegeben unter Mitarbeit von Hans–Christian Lucas, Band 10, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (11): Vorlesungen über Logik und Metaphysik, Heidelberg 1817, — Mitgeschrieben von Franz Anton Good, Karen Gloy, Hrsg., Band 11, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1992).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (12): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Berlin 1822–1823, — Nachschriften von Karl Gustav Julius von Griesheim, Heinrich Gustav Hotho & Friedrich Carl Hermann Victor von Kehler, Karl Brehmer, Karl–Heinz Ilting & Hoo Nam Seelmann, Herausgegeben, Band 12, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (13): Vorlesung über die Philosophie des Geistes, Berlin 1827–1828, — Nachgeschrieben von Johann Eduard Erdmann & Ferdinand Walter,Franz Hespe & Burkhard Tuschling, Herausgegeben, Band 13, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1994).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (14): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Rechts, Berlin 1819–1820, — Nachgeschrieben von Johann Rudolf Ringier, Emil Angehrn, Martin Bondeli & Hoo Nam Seelmann, Herausgegeben, Band 14, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (15): Vorlesungen über philosophische Enzyklopädie,
Nürnberg 1812–1813, — Nachschriften von Christian Samuel Meinel & Julius Friedrich Heinrich Abegg, Udo Rameil, Hrsg., Band 15, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (16): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Natur, Berlin 1819–1820, — Nachgeschrieben von Johann Rudolf Ringier, Martin Bondeli & Hoo Nam Seelmann, Herausgegeben, Band 16, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (17): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Natur, Berlin 1825–1826, — Nachgeschrieben von Heinrich Wilhelm Dove, Karol Bal, Gilles Marmasse, Thomas Posch & Klaus Vieweg, Herausgegeben, Band 17, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2007).

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Paul Baran, On Distributed Communications, (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1964).

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Anthony F. Beavers, “Minds and Computers: Phenomenology and Artificial Intelligence,” Cyberphilosophy: The Intersection of Computing and Philosophy, Terrell Ward Bynum & James H. Moor, editors; Collin Allen, John A. Barker, Anthony F. Beavers, Terrell Ward Bynum, Marvin Croy, Randall R. Dipert, Charles Ess, Luciano Floridi, Patrick Grim, Gene Korienek, Gert–Jan Lokhorst, Pete Mandik, Walter Maner, James H. Moor Uri Nodelman, Richard Scheines, Susan Stuart, John P. Sullins, William Uzgalis, Jeroen Van Den Hoven, John Weckert & Edward N. Zalta, contributors & Armen T. Marsoobian & Brian J. Huschle, series editors, (Oxford, Oxfordshire: Basil Henry Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002), 66–77.

Timothy John Berners–Lee, “World–Wide Web Software Put into Public Domain,” Information Standards Quarterly, 5.2(1993): 21–22.

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Mark Burgin & Wolfgang Hofkirchner, editors, Information Studies and the Quest for Transdisciplinarity: Unity Through Diversity, (Toh Tuck Link, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company Incorporated, 2017).

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